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Research has shown that specific tax is more effective in discouraging the behavior of smoking 
than ad valorem tax. This paper makes use of panel data on 39 countries to investigate the 
impact of increased reliance on specific tax on cigarette consumption. The data used includes 
21 countries, from six WHO regions, that increased their reliance on specific tax between 2008 
and 2016. The fixed effects and random effects models are employed to estimate the extent to 
which a change in the specific share of excise tax changes the per capita consumption of 
cigarettes. According to the results, a one percent increase in the share of specific tax is 
associated with a 0.16 percent decline in per capita consumption.  The findings support the 
assertion that increased reliance on specific tax results in a more significant decline cigarette 
consumption. The paper recommends that policymakers should aim to implement a health-
driven taxation policy which entails a heavy reliance on specific tax on cigarettes and other 
tobacco products. However, it is essential to keep in mind that reliance on specific tax may 
only be useful when adopted with along with other strategies of tobacco control such as 
combating illicit trade. 

















Cigarette taxation plays a significant role in tobacco control. According to the World Health 
Organization (WHO) report on global tobacco epidemic 2008, raising taxes to increase the 
price of cigarette is considered the most efficient and cost-effective means to reduce cigarette 
consumption (WHO, 2008). Article 6 of WHO's Framework Convention for Tobacco Control 
(FCTC) encourages parties to implement policies that improve public health through the 
taxation of tobacco products. Some countries (such as The European Union, Pakistan, Norway, 
and United States, etc.) have adopted such policies. A health-driven taxation policy aims to 
increase the retail prices of cigarettes, especially for low-priced brands(International Agency 
for Research on Cancer, 2011). The principle of using excise tax as a tobacco control strategy 
is simple. An increase in the excise tax leads to a rise in retail prices of cigarettes which 
ultimately reduces consumption (Sullivan & Dutkowsky, 2012). Many studies have supported 
the negative correlation between prices and consumption and it is not contested (Chaloupka et 
al., 2000; Chiou & Muehlegger, 2014). To a large extent, the effectiveness of taxation in 
reducing smoking depends on the structure of the excise tax. 
Excise taxes may be levied as specific or ad valorem tax. Specific tax is independent of price, 
and it is imposed based on quantity (e.g., per pack or weight) whereas ad valorem tax is 
imposed as a percentage of value (manufactures price or retail price) (Chaloupka, Yurekli & 
Fong, 2012). The structures of the excise tax systems may be classified into three categories; 
specific only, ad valorem only and mixed system (a combination of both).  Countries adopting 
these structures may implement a uniform tax rate on all cigarettes or use a tiered system where 
different tax rates are imposed on cigarettes based on specific characteristics (e.g., brand, 
length, whether a filter is present, or price). The choice of excise structure may have a 
significant impact on how smokers and manufacturers react to increased taxation.   
The two main factors- related to the excise tax structure- affecting the effectiveness of increased 
taxation are substitution and tax avoidance. Brand-substitution is a concept used to describe 
one of the price minimizing strategies used by smokers in response to increased prices. It entails 
the switch from premium brands to low-priced brands. A study by Choi et al. (2011) evaluated 
the price minimizing behaviour of smokers using data on seven hundred eighteen smokers from 
the Minnesota Adult tobacco survey. The results of the study show that 78% of the smokers 
used at least one price minimizing strategy to save money on cigarettes and 32% of these 
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smokers changed to cheaper brands in response to the resulting increase in the cost of 
smoking(Choi et al., 2012).  In cases where the tax is dependent on the price of cigarettes, a 
significant price gap between brands provides opportunities for tax avoidance as producers are 
encouraged to flood the markets with cheaper brands to avoid higher taxes (Emmanuel 
Guindon et al., 2014). The presence of these factors (substitution and tax avoidance) depends 
on, among others, the structure of the excise tax imposed on cigarettes.  
Uniform specific tax is associated with relatively higher prices especially for lower-priced 
brands (Shang et al., 2014). Therefore, uniform tax reduces the incentives for smokers to switch 
to lower-priced brands because it ensures that there is a smaller price gap between lower-priced 
and premium brands. A further advantage of uniform specific taxation is that it is easier to 
implement and administer because it is based volume and not price. However, the value of the 
specific tax can be eroded by inflation if not adjusted regularly. Ad valorem tax, on the other 
hand, is associated with more significant price gaps between low and premium brands and thus, 
consumers are encouraged to consume cheaper brands.  Its dependence on value makes ad 
valorem tax is more challenging to implement and manage(International Agency for Research 
on Cancer, 2011). Furthermore, under the ad valorem tax producers may be encouraged to 
produce low priced brands as a way avoiding higher tax from high priced brands. 
Countries differ in the structure of cigarette excise tax. Most developed countries tend to use 
specific tax except the European Union (EU) member countries (Shang et al., 2014).  EU 
member countries are required by the European Commission to implement a mixed tax system 
comprising an element of both specific and ad valorem (Cnossen, 2012). However, although 
member countries commit to this requirement, EU countries differ in their degree of reliance 
on specific or ad valorem tax.  Most developing countries, on the other hand, tend to rely more 
on ad valorem and mixed tax systems (Shang et al., 2014) 
A change in excise tax structure towards more reliance on specific tax may be essential to the 
effectiveness of health-driven taxation policy. Such a system will not only increase prices but 
also reduce the price gap between premium brands and low-priced brands. High reliance on 
specific tax will help to prevent cigarette users from switching to low priced brands in response 
to a tax increase. However, the price of such a move is that it increases the tax burden on the 
lower price brands and reduces the burden on premium brands. Some countries have made 
changes to their excise tax structures towards higher reliance on specific tax (World Health 
Organization, 2010, 2015). Some nations that previously relied solely on ad valorem tax have 
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either changed to specific only or mixed system whereas those using a mixed tax system have 
increased the specific component of excise tax and are relying less on ad valorem tax.  To 
the best of our knowledge, there is no study that has explored the association between cigarette 
excise tax structure and cigarette consumption.  This paper contributes to the literature by 
estimating the magnitude of the decrease in consumption resulting from increased reliance on 
specific excise tax using data of countries from six regions. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The review of literature about tax structure and 
its effect on price are presented in section 2. Section 3 details the information on the data and 
methodology used for the analysis. The results and discussions are presented in section 4. 




















The effect of different excise tax structures on cigarette prices has received a lot of attention in 
the literature on tobacco control(Chaloupka et al., 2010; Chaloupka, Kostova & Shang, 2014; 
Liber et al., 2015). While authors differ in the methodologies used to conduct their studies, they 
tend to draw similar conclusions. The typical finding is that specific uniform tax is the most 
effective tax structure in reducing cigarette consumption (Chaloupka, Kostova & Shang, 2014; 
Liber et al., 2015) 
Using data on 21 EU countries, Chaloupka et al. (2010) examined the effect of excise tax 
structure on cigarettes prices. The aim of the study was to compare the effect of a tax increase 
in countries with a high proportion of ad valorem tax against those that relied more on specific 
tax.  The results of the study indicate that an increase in excise taxation is associated with a 
higher price gap between premium and lower-priced brands in countries with a higher share of 
ad valorem tax. The effects of a higher price gap between brands may promote the consumption 
of cheaper brands as highlighted by Choi et al. (2011).  The study found that while high reliance 
on specific tax is the most effective way of reducing cigarette consumption, its effectiveness 
depends on the manufactures market power. The effect of an increase in specific excise tax 
disappears as the degree of concentration increases. However, this finding contradicts the 
findings of Linegar and Van Walbeek (2016) who found that low levels of competition in the 
cigarette market are associated with a higher specific excise tax pass-through (Linegar & van 
Walbeek, in press). 
Shang et al. (2014) used data on 16 countries from the International Tobacco Control Policy 
Evaluation (ITC) Project to study the distribution of cigarette prices under different tax 
structures. Countries with similar income levels were pared as well as those that levied an 
identical total excise tax. The study employed the two-sample comparison test to compare the 
mean and variance of self-reported cigarette prices. The findings of the study indicate that 
countries with tax structures deviating from uniform specific taxation are characterized with 
price distributions associated with high variability.  The results illustrate that countries that rely 
heavily on ad valorem tax are associated with greater price variability around the median. 
Among the mixed taxation systems, countries relying more on ad valorem tax tend to have a 
greater price variability than those with a greater reliance on specific tax.  Furthermore, the 
results show that, unlike uniform tax structures, tiered tax structures are associated with 
cigarette prices that are skewed more towards lower prices (Shang et al., 2014). Based on these 
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results, the authors concluded that cigarette tax structures that depart from uniform tax structure 
are associated with opportunities for tax avoidance and brand switching.  
A similar study was conducted by Chaloupka et al. (2014). The objective of this study was to 
compare the price variability under each tax structure using brand-specific data on the average 
prices of cigarette brands. According to the findings, price variability was high in countries 
with ad valorem uniform taxation, mixed uniform taxation, and tiered structures as compared 
to those with only specific uniform taxation. Likewise, Liber et al. (2014) studied five 
Southeast Asian countries and compared countries with ad valorem tax to those with multitier 
specific tax. Like the findings of other papers, countries with ad valorem tax structures 
(Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam) had more price variability than those with multitier 


















The objective of the paper is to provide empirical evidence of the extent to which increasing 
reliance on specific tax affects the consumption of cigarettes. To achieve this, the paper makes 
use of panel data on 39 countries. The decision of the number of countries to consider in the 
study was based on the data availability of the period 2008-2016. Data on Per Capita cigarette 
consumption was available for more than 100 countries. However, for most of these countries, 
the data could only go as far as 2012. The lack of consumption data for the period 2013-2016 
disqualified these countries from being considered in the study. Furthermore, data on tax 
structure was not available for most the countries. Countries without tax data were also not 
considered. Only 39 countries had all the required data covering the period of interest.   
The data frequency is yearly and the period of study is 2008 to 2016. The main variables of the 
study are;  total per capita cigarette consumption and the specific share of total excise tax 
(calculated as specific tax ÷ [specific tax and ad valorem tax]). The specific share variable is a 
value between zero and one where zero means ad valorem only system, one is specific only, 
and a value between zero and one represents a mixed tax system. Other variables considered 
in the study include Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the dollar price of cigarettes.  The data 
was collected from many sources. Data on cigarette consumption and smoking population data 
were obtained from a series of country-specific reports, by ERC, which contains detailed 
information about the cigarette market. Tax and nominal price (US dollars) data, based on the 
Most Popular Brand (MPB), were collected from table 9.1.0 of WHO reports on global tobacco 
epidemic (2017). Information on excise structure was also derived from these tables.  Finally, 
the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted GDP data was obtained from the data portal of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
The 39 countries come from six different WHO regions. These regions include; the South-East 
Asia Region (SEAR), Africa, the Americas, West Pacific Region (WPR), East Mediterranean 
Region (EMR) and Europe. The countries in the study can be classified into two broad 
categories. The first is a group of 12 countries that have changed their excise tax structure 
towards more reliance on specific tax in the study periods (2008 - 2016). These countries are 
characterized by at least one of the following; a change from ad valorem only to specific only, 
a change from ad valorem only a mixed tax, an increase in the specific component while 
reducing the ad valorem component or increasing the specific tax while leaving the ad valorem 
component unchanged. The second group includes 19 countries that were added as controls. 
These countries either did not change their excise tax structure or changed it by reducing 
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reliance on specific tax. From this point forward, "category one" will be used to refer to 
countries that changed their tax structure towards high specific tax whereas "category two" will 




Table 1: Countries that 
changed their tax 
structure towards higher 
reliance on specific tax 
 
  
Excise structure change   
Region  Country  Previous structure  New structure 
Africa Congo  Ad valorem only Mixed tax system  
  Mozambique  Ad valorem only Specific Only 
  Zimbabwe  Ad valorem only Specific Only 
America Chile  Ad valorem only Mixed tax system  
  Peru  Ad valorem only Specific Only  
EMR Jordan  Mixed tax system Specific Only 
  Morocco  Mixed tax system Higher specific share within a mixed tax system 
  Pakistan  Mixed tax system Specific Only 
EUR Denmark  Mixed tax system Higher specific share within a mixed tax system 
  Greece  Mixed tax system Higher specific share within a mixed tax system 
  Ireland  Mixed tax system Higher specific share within a mixed tax system 
  Latvia  Mixed tax system Higher specific share within a mixed tax system 
  Netherlands  Mixed tax system Higher specific share within a mixed tax system 
  Slovenia  Mixed tax system Higher specific share within a mixed tax system 
  Sweden  Mixed tax system Higher specific share within a mixed tax system 
  Turkey  Ad valorem only Mixed tax system  
  Ukraine  Mixed tax system Specific Only 
SEAR India  Mixed tax system Specific Only 
  Myanmar  Ad valorem only Specific Only 
WPR Laos   Ad valorem only Mixed tax system  
  Malaysia  Mixed tax system Specific Only 
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The three African countries in table 1 all previously relied on ad valorem only. Mozambique 
and Zimbabwe changed their tax structures to specific only while Congo switched to a mixed 
taxation structure.  Congo introduced the specific tax in 2014, towards the end of the study 
period, and it experienced just a slight decrease in the percentage of ad valorem tax from 
15.48% in 2008 to 14.77% in 2016.  Mozambique made a complete shift to ad valorem tax by 
2010 and then increased its percentage of specific tax from 12% in 2010 to 14.86% in 2016. 
Zimbabwe, on the other hand, switched to specific only by 2012 and then slightly increased its 
percentage of specific tax from   20% to 22.86%. Tax data on these countries reveal that the 
excise tax does not form a significant proportion of the retail price. For instance, the average 
total excise tax (ad valorem + specific tax) in the study period was 17.47% and 11.06% 
respectively.  
The Americas and the Western Pacific Region (WPR) each have only two countries belonging 
to category one. Chile used the ad valorem only taxation system in 2008 and 2010, but by the 
year 2012, it had switched a mixed tax system by introducing the specific component. Chile 
reduced its percentage of ad valorem from 60.4% in 2008 to 30% in 2016 and increased the 
portion of specific tax from 3.28% in 2008 to 43.16% in 2016. In Laos, excise tax does not 
account for a significant part of the cigarette price. Nevertheless, it also increased its reliance 
specific tax by moving from an ad valorem only to a mixed taxation system. This change 
happened by the year 2010. After the introduction of the specific tax in 2010, the percentage 
ad valorem tax decreased from 2.29% in 2010 to 1.64% in 2016, and the percentage of specific 
tax increased from 2% in 2010 to 7.14% in 2016. 
As shown in table 1, most of the category one countries belong to the European region. Most 
of these countries belong to the European Union, and as such, they are required to maintain a 
mixed tax system by law. Among the EU member countries, some countries experienced a 
drastic decrease in their reliance on the ad valorem component as a percentage of the retail 
price. For instance, Netherland decreased its ad valorem component from 20.52% in 2008 to 
0.83% in 2016. Similarly, Sweden and Denmark experienced an ad valorem reduction from 
39.2% and 20.8% in 2008, respectively, to 1% in 2016. Other EU members only experienced 
a slight decrease in the ad valorem component and still had a relatively more significant 
percentage of ad valorem tax by the year 2016. For example, Latvia decreased the rate of ad 
valorem tax from 32.2% in 2008 to 25% in 2016. Ukraine is the only non-EU member country, 
in the European region, which is part of the category one nations. Unlike the EU members, 
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Ukraine was able to switch from a mixed tax structure to specific only taxation by reducing its 
ad valorem component from 20.8% in 2010 to 0% in 2013 through to 2016.   
Only two countries in the South East Asian Region (SEAR) are part of the category one nations. 
Table 1 shows that India changed its tax structure from the mixed taxation system to specific 
only whereas Myanmar changed from ad valorem only to specific only taxation. According to 
the data, although India gradually reduced its ad valorem component to 0%, the ad valorem 
component was minimal for the entire study period. In 2008, the ad valorem component 
accounted for 0.85% of the retail price. This percentage dropped to 0.72% in 2010 and to 0% 
in 2016. Initially, Myanmar increased its ad valorem component of cigarette price from 25% 
to 50%. However, by 2016, the specific tax was introduced and accounted for 35.29% of retail 
price whereas the percentage of ad valorem tax decreased to 0%. 
The Eastern Mediterranean region has three countries belonging to category one. Jordan and 
Pakistan changed from a mixed taxation system to specific only. In 2008, Jordan relied heavily 
on ad valorem tax as it accounted for 25% of the retail price but the percentage reduced to 0% 
in 2014. Pakistan's reliance on ad valorem, on the other hand, was relatively low. Pakistan 
decreased the ad valorem component from 3.8% in 2008 to 0% in 2014. Morocco maintained 
its mixed taxation system but reduced its reliance on ad valorem tax from 50% in 2008 of the 














Panel data, also known as cross-sectional time-series or longitudinal data, consists of a set of 
repeated observations of the same cross-sectional unit (e.g., a country). One of the main 
advantages of using panel data for economic research is that, unlike the conventional time-
series or cross-sectional data, panel data is made up of both a cross-sectional component and 
time series component (Hsiao, 2007). The cross-sectional component reflects the differences 
between entities whereas the time-series component reflects how an entity changes over time. 
A researcher may, therefore, focus on the observed differences between countries considered 
in the study or how an observed variable for a country changes during the study period. A large 
set of repeated observations may also provide the researcher with a large dataset allowing for 
analysis with better estimates of the parameters under consideration. Furthermore, panel data 
provides the researcher with many unique data points which help in increasing the researcher's 
degrees of freedom to explore the variables and the relationship between them. 
Economic researchers employ various types of techniques to analyze panel data. These may 
include fixed effects, random effects, and pooled OLS regressions (Baltagi, Bresson & Pirotte, 
2003). Multiple regression techniques may also be used for panel data. However, they are not 
considered optimal because the coefficients tend to suffer from omitted variable bias. This 
problem arises when there is an unobserved variable affecting the dependent variable which 
cannot be controlled for.  
Our study aims to estimate the extent to which increasing reliance on specific tax changes per 
capita cigarette consumption. To do this, we estimate the model below:  
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 log(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) +
 𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡            (1)  
We estimate equation one by regressing consumption per capita on price, the specific share of 
the excise tax, GDP per capita and region. Our variable of interest is the specific share. The 
specific share variable is a value between zero and one, where zero represents a country using 
ad valorem only taxation, and one means that a country imposes only specific taxation on 
cigarettes. The coefficient on this variable will provide an estimate of the magnitude of the 
change in cigarette consumption resulting from increased reliance on specific tax. According 
to the economic theory of demand, we expect the price to have a negative relationship with 
consumption per capita. GDP per capita is expected to be positively related to consumption per 
capita because an increase in income results in an increase in the expenditure on all goods 
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including cigarettes. The regional dummies are incorporated into the equation to control for 
differences between regions. To estimate equation one, the paper employs three estimation 
methods which are widely used in panel literature. These include, pooled OLS, Random Effects 
and Fixed effects estimation methods. Tests will be conducted to choose the best estimation 
method.  
 
The pooled OLS Estimator 
The simplest panel data technique is the pooled OLS regression. This technique ignores the 
cross-section and time series nature of the dataset.  Equation two shows the structure of the 
pooled OLS model. 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 log(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) +
 𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡                          (2) 
Equation two assumes that the error term (µ) is independent across each entity (i) and time (t), 
E (µ) =0 and var (µ) = δ² (i.e. µ~N (0, δ²) iid). This implies that for any given entity (x), there 
is no serial correlation between observations and the errors are not heteroskedastic. However, 
ignoring the structure of panel data by assuming constant coefficients entails that most 
advantages of panel data are lost. Furthermore, the assumption that the errors are identical and 
independently distributed (iid) may lead to biased results. However, since the assumption of 
the model meets those of a classical regression model, the model is efficiently estimated by 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  
Most applied economic studies that are based on panel data make use of pooled OLS as a 
starting point of their empirical analysis. Similarly, this paper will begin the analysis of panel 
data with the results from pooled OLS model despite its potential bias. The most reliable 
results, however, will be obtained from the fixed effects and random effects models which are 
considered to be suitable techniques for panel data. The main difference between these two 
techniques is based on the assumptions they make about the error term in the model.  
 
Fixed effects and Random Effects   
The estimation methods used in the paper are the random effects model and the fixed effects 




𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 log(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) +
 𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        
Where Ɛ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + ŋ𝑖𝑡       (3)     
In model three, 𝛼𝑖 is the individual specific effect and ŋ𝑖𝑡 is the common error term. The 
individual specific effect varies across cross-sectional unit but constant over time whereas the 
error term varies both across time and units. The main assumption that differentiates fixed 
effects from random effects models is whether the 𝛼𝑖 may be correlated with 𝑥𝑖 (the cross-
sectional unit) or not. Unlike the random effects model, the fixed effects model assumes that 
the unobserved individual effect is correlated with the explanatory variables. In the fixed effect 
model, the estimated coefficients cannot be biased because the model omits all time-invariant 
variables. However, unlike the fixed effects model where the intercept absorbs all time-
invariant variables, the random effects model enables the researcher to include time-invariant 
explanatory variables (Gardiner, Luo & Roman, 2009). The advantage of using the random 
effects model is that it allows for the analysis of the role played by time-invariant variables 
(Baltagi, Bresson & Pirotte, 2003). For instance, the random effects model will provide 
coefficients for the regional dummies in equation three whereas the fixed effects model will 
eliminate them from the model. However, it is worth noting that elasticity estimates obtained 
using Random effects and fixed effects are usually smaller than typically found in country 
estimates (Blecher, 2008).   
The F-test will be used to test the significance of the random effects model, and the Breusch-
Pagan LM test will be used to test the significance of the fixed effects model. If both models 
are significant, the Hausman (1978) test will be used to choose between random and fixed 
effect. The pooled OLS model will be considered the most preferred model where the random 
and fixed effects are both insignificant.  
 The Hausman (1978) test is an accepted model to choose between random and fixed effects 
models. The null hypothesis is that the coefficients obtained by the random effects model are 
the same as those from the fixed effects model. The rejection of the null hypothesis entails that 
the coefficients of the random effects model are biased and inconsistent due the violation of 
the Gauss Markov theorem. The rule of thumb is, use fixed effects if the null hypothesis is 






Data from all 39 countries indicates a steady increase in average specific share over the entire 
period. As shown in table 2, average specific share increased from 27% in 2008 to 50% in 
2016. The average share of ad valorem tax, on the other hand, has decreased drastically from 
72% in 2008 to 48% in 2016. The study period is also characterized by a steady increase in the 
average retail price of a pack of 20 cigarettes from US$2.05 to US$3.19. There is a downward 
trend in cigarette use in the entire study period as seen from a decrease in the average per capita 
consumption from 875.72 pieces per year to 716 pieces per year. 










(pieces per year) 
Average 
Specific share 
(% of total 
excise tax) 
Average ad 
valorem share (% 
of total excise tax) 
2008 2.05 748 28 72 
2010 2.27 813 31 69 
2012 2.56 838 39 61 
2014 3.13 759 47 53 
2016 3.19 743 51 48 
 
Table 3: Average prices for category one and category two countries 
 
 
Year  Average retail  price (Category 1) Average retail price (category 2)  
2008 2.64 1.28 
2010 2.82 1.56 
2012 3.13 1.84 
2014 3.58 2.54 
2016 3.38 2.94 
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Table 3 shows the cigarette prices for each of the two categories of countries considered in the 
study. Both groups experienced an increase in average prices. The average prices of category 
two increased from US$1.28 to US$ 2.94 whereas the prices for category one increased from 
US$2.64 to US$3.38. The table also shows that throughout the study period, the average prices 
of category one were greater than those of category two. Despite the increase in the average 
prices for both categories, the decrease in average per capita consumption of cigarettes for 
category two is much less than that of category one as illustrated in fig1. Per capita 
consumption of category one countries decreased gradually over the entire study period 
whereas that of category two nations increased from 2008 to 2012 and then decreased gradually 
between 2012 and 2016. This paper examines the extent to which increased reliance on specific 
tax results in decreased per capita consumption. 














































Consumption for change vs no change
Category 1 Category 2
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Figure 2: bar graphs showing per capita consumption from 2008 to 2016 
 
 
Fig 2 is based on category one countries. In Fig2; AM represents the average per capita 
consumption of countries that changed their excise tax structure from ad valorem to mixed tax, 
AS represents the direct switch ad valorem only to specific only, MM represents the increase 
in specific share within the mixed system, and MS is the change from mixed tax to specific 
only.  The countries that experienced the largest decrease in per capita consumption are those 
that increased the specific component while maintaining the mixed tax system. These were 
followed by countries that change their structure from mixed system to specific only. Fig 2 
shows that on average, countries that made a direct switch from ad valorem tax only to specific 
tax only experienced a gradual increase in per capita consumption from 175 in 2008 to 220 in 
2016. To estimate the extent to which increased reliance on specific tax reduces cigarette 
consumption, we employ panel data regressions analysis.  
Empirical Results 
The results obtained from the pooled OLS, random effects and fixed effects models are 
presented in table 4. We first start by reporting the results of the pooled OLS model. The signs 
on the coefficients are in accord with our expectations. Our variable of interest is the specific 
share of excise tax. As expected, there exists a negative relationship between cigarette 
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consumption and specific share of excise tax. According to the coefficient, a one percent 
increase in the specific share on excise tax results in a 0.32% decrease in per capita 
consumption. The results confirm the existence of inverse and significant relationship between 
price and per capita consumption of cigarettes. The coefficient on price indicates that a one 
percent increase in price translates into a 0.64% decrease in cigarette consumption. GDP per 
capita is positively related to cigarette consumption such that an increase in GDP per capita by 
one percent results in a 0.84% increase in per capita consumption.  As discussed in the previous 
section, the coefficients of the pooled OLS model are biased because the model ignores the 
structure of panel data. However, the model is good to use as a starting point for our analysis. 
Having reported the results obtained from the pooled OLS model, we now move on to reporting 



















Table 4: Regression results 
Dependent variable: Log of consumption per capita 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES pooled OLS Random effects Fixed effects 
        
Log price -0.635*** -0.148** -0.106* 
  (0.0884) (0.0575) (0.0588) 
Log GDP 0.836*** 0.348*** 0.277** 
  (0.106) (0.104) (0.115) 
Specific share -0.321*** -0.171*** -0.163** 
  (0.117) (0.0628) (0.0636) 




2.AMR -0.0188 0.557   
  (0.244) (0.452)   
3.EMR 0.692*** 1.289***   
  (0.219) (0.419)   
4.EUR 0.934*** 1.557***   
  (0.259) (0.418)   
5.SEAR 0.275 0.702*   
  (0.203) (0.411)   
6.WPR 0.662*** 1.352***   




Constant -1.417* 2.193*** 3.801*** 











Number of countries   39 39 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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As mentioned earlier, the fixed effects and random models are different due to the different 
assumptions that each model makes. Before reporting the results of these models, it is important 
to assess which model is the most appropriate and preferred to use. The Hausman specification 
test was used to choose between the two models under the null hypothesis that the individual 
effects are not correlated with the explanatory variables (Hausman 1978). According to the 
results of the specification test, the null hypothesis is rejected at 1% level of significance. This 
means that the fixed effects model is the most preferred model to use.  
Since the fixed effects model is the most preferred model, the following interpretation is based 
on the results from the fixed effects model. Like the pooled OLS model, the signs on the 
coefficients meet our expectations. However, the coefficients of the fixed effects model are 
smaller than those of the pooled OLS model. Per capita consumption of cigarettes declines with 
an increase in the specific share of excise tax. Increasing the share of specific tax by one percent 
is associated with a 0.16% decrease cigarette consumption. The results also indicate that a one 
percent increase in the price is associated with a 0.1% decrease in cigarette consumption. GDP 
per capita has a positive and significant relationship with cigarette consumption such that when 
GDP per capita increases by one percent, consumption increases by 0.28%.  The random effects 
model also indicate that specific share has a negative and significant relationship with per 
capita consumption of cigarettes. The empirical results, therefore, provide evidence in support 
of the proposition in the literature that increasing reliance on specific tax is effective in reducing 












DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION 
According to the descriptive statistics, the data shows that on average, countries around the 
world are increasing their reliance on specific tax. The benefit of changing the tax structure 
towards more reliance on specific tax is best highlighted by fig 1. On average, countries that 
changed their excise tax structure experienced a drastic reduction in cigarette consumption as 
compared those that did not make such a change. The results of this paper support the assertion 
that increased reliance on specific tax is associated with a significant decrease in cigarette 
consumption. Our study has shown that increasing specific share of excise by one percent 
reduced per capita consumption of cigarettes by 0.16%.  A health driven taxation policy which 
relies heavily on specific excise tax for cigarettes results can, therefore, improve public health.  
The data used in the study indicate that increasing reliance on specific excise tax may not 
always result in decreased cigarettes consumption.  According to section 3 of this study, while 
the average consumption decreased for category one countries, developing countries that 
directly changed from ad valorem only to specific only (i.e., Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and 
Myanmar) experienced an increase in per capita consumption. However, this does not mean 
that increased reliance on specific tax was not effective in reducing cigarette consumption. As 
suggested by Chaloupka et al. (2010), this outcome could be a result of the characteristics of 
the cigarette markets, in these countries, such as the manufactures market power. Furthermore, 
the data shows that average total excise tax as a percentage of the price for Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique in the study period was 17.47% and 11.06% respectively. These proportions of 
total excise tax may have been too small for the tax change to reduce consumption effectively. 
Finally, in the case of Myanmar, the switch from ad valorem only to specific only happened 
towards the end of the study period (between 2014 and 2016). It might have been too early to 
observe the effects of the change in structure.  
It is therefore recommended for policymakers to implement a tax based policy which entails a 
heavy reliance on a specific tax for cigarettes and other tobacco products. However, it is 
essential to keep in mind that reliance on specific tax may only be effective when adopted with 
along with other strategies of tobacco control such as combating illicit trade.  
One major limitation of the study is that the study period was short and many countries changed 
their tax structures towards the end of the period under review. Given the fact that policy 
changes may take some time to produce results, it's possible that some countries had not seen 
the effect of the change in the study period. For future research, we recommend the replication 
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of this study but with a more extensive period of study to allow the effects of the structure 
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